

Consistent generation of stress scenarios – normative and practical considerations

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The views presented are mine alone and do not necessarily represent those of my employer.

- EIOPA and Stress testing
 - o 2011 Insurance Stress Test
 - Objectives
 - Scenarios
 - Results
- Framework considerations
 - o Coordination between relevant bodies
 - o Modeling aspects
- Some observations
 - o Methodologies
 - o Scope
 - o Consistency
 - o Empirical example

- Observations from EIOPA regulation [articles 21(2), 23, 32(2)]:
 - o Initiate and coordinate Union-wide stress tests
 - o Assess and evaluate the effect of adverse market developments on the:
 - resilience of financial institutions
 - systemic risk posed by financial institutions (Insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions)
 - the potential for systemic risk to increase in situations of stress
 - o Develop and Implement common:
 - methodologies for assessing the effects of economic scenarios
 - methodologies for assessing the effects of particular products and distribution processes
 - communication approaches for stress testing outcomes

- Objectives – in accordance with the mandate, to:
 - o Assess the resilience of the EU insurance sector
 - o Understand capital position of insurers in adverse situations
 - o Evaluate if current available capital supports financial stability of the market

- EIOPA stress testing is seen as:
 - o An important supervisory and risk management tool
 - o A test of “what if” scenarios to explore insurance companies vulnerabilities

- The EIOPA stress test is not:
 - o A solvency exercise
 - o A second guess of capital requirements

- Framework:
 - o Stress test based on EU future risk-based regulation - Solvency II
 - o Assets and liabilities valued on a market consistent basis
 - o Macroeconomic scenarios provided by the ECB
 - o Shock scenarios developed by EIOPA to highlight risks of particular relevance to insurers

- Coverage:
 - o 221 (re)insurance groups and companies in the European Union, European Economic Area, Switzerland
 - o 58 groups and 71 individual undertakings reported results (aggregated group reporting)
 - o Achieved goal of minimum coverage of 50% by premium income per country
 - o Represents approximately 60% of the market share

- Scenarios:
 - o Baseline (severe stress)
 - o Adverse (more severe market deterioration in the main macroeconomic variables) Macroeconomic scenarios provided by the ECB
 - o Inflation (increase in inflation -> rapid increase interest rates)
- Satellites:
 - o Sovereign risk
 - o Low yield environment
- Risks:
 - o Market (interest rate, equity, real estate)
 - o Credit (spread risk: investment grade, high yield)
 - o Insurance (natural catastrophe, pandemic event, reinsurance)

2011 - Scenarios



Risk modules	Baseline scenario	Adverse scenario	Inflation scenario
Market Risk			
Interest rate			
<3M	-40 bps	-125 bps	+125 bps
>3M	-20 bps	-62.5 bps	+62.5 bps
Equities	-7.5%	-15%	0%
Real estate Residential	-3.8%	-11.6%	0%
Real estate Commercial	-12.5%	-25%	0%
Credit Risk			
Spread risk	Spread increases as a function of rating (AAA to B), from 0.125-1.5%-points	Spread increases as a function of rating (AAA to B), from 0.25-3.0%-points	
Investment Grade	+15.7% increase in spreads	+31.4% increase in spreads	0%
High-yield	+19.15% increase in spreads	+38.3% increase in spreads	0%

2011 - Scenarios


Insurance Risks	
Non-Life Insurance related stresses	The greater of the following: (1) the largest one-in-two-hundred natural catastrophe probable maximum loss (PML), where only a 70% recovery rate from reinsurers can be assumed; (2) a shortfall arising for all non-life claims reserves by assuming a 2 percentage point higher claims inflation than presumed for existing best estimate calculations without recourse to reinsurers.
Life Insurance related stresses	The greater of the following: (1) An additional 1.5 deaths per thousand lives, assumed to follow from a pandemic event where the recovery rate from the two largest reinsurers on the panel is only 50%; (2) An increase of 23% in mortality improvement rates, over and above the developments already factored into the best estimates, with no recovery from reinsurers.
Sovereign Risk	Country specific yield curve movements were defined on the basis of macroeconomic assumptions for EU-Member States, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The magnitude of the resulting adverse yield curve movements was calibrated to reflect the outlook per country and would therefore affect the pricing of sovereign bond holdings in insurance undertakings asset holdings.
Aggregation of Risks	The risk sources market/credit risk and insurance risks are added using the following correlation matrix.

<i>i</i>	<i>j</i>	Market and Credit	Life	Non-Life
Market and Credit		1		
Life		0.25	1	
Non-Life		0.25	1	1

- Methodology similar to QIS5
- QIS5 curves were produced by the industry
- The following procedure is used to derive stress-test curves:
 - o Swap rates are bootstrapped into forward rates
 - o Credit risk adjustment of -10bp is implemented
 - o Zero rates are calculated from forwards:
 - Interpolation is done using cubic splines
 - Extrapolation is done with Smith-Wilson
 - o Illiquidity premiums per currency are then added to the calculated zero curves

2011 Stress test

Discount Curves – an example:



Results - Capital

Aggregated Figures			
	in EUR billion	in %	
Eligible capital before stress	577		
Minimum Required Capital (MCR) before stress	152		
Solvency Surplus	425		
MCR coverage ratio		380%	
MCR coverage ratio in baseline scenario		320%	
MCR coverage ratio in adverse scenario		281%	
MCR coverage ratio in inflation scenario		342%	
Impact on eligible capital	in EUR billion	as a percentage of eligible capital	Solvency deficit of undertakings not meeting the MCR (in EUR billion)
Baseline scenario	92	15.9	2.6
Adverse scenario	150	26.0	4.4
Inflation scenario	58	10.0	2.5
Sovereign Stress Scenario	33	5.6	3.4

2011 – MCR thresholds




Scenarios	Number of insurers failing MCR	Number of insurers failing MCR in %	Solvency deficit of undertakings not meeting the MCR (in EUR billion)
Baseline scenario	11	9%	2.6
Adverse scenario	13	10%	4.4
Inflation scenario	10	8%	2.5
Sovereign Stress Scenario	6	5%	3.4

- Overall the European insurance sector remains robust in the occurrence of major shocks
- 90% of the groups/undertakings tested continue to comply with the Minimum Capital Requirements even in the most adverse scenario

Main vulnerabilities identified:

- Adverse developments in yield curves and sovereign bond markets
- Higher than expected rate of severe natural catastrophes combined with limited recourse to reinsurance facilities

Framework considerations – Cooperation



Framework considerations – Modeling aspects



- Some initial considerations:
 - o Is a joint and consistent modeling framework needed – like a regulators version of Economic Scenario Generators know from corporate vendors?
 - o Agreement on underlying drivers or simply on the framework as such?
 - o How to translate fundamental drivers into consistent adverse frameworks for banking and insurance?
 - o Will a joint framework lead to model risk – and does this call for local models?
 - o Link between banking and insurance stress
- On the drawing board of the FS-area of EIOPA:
 - o A simulation engine for financial asset returns and prices
 - o Built on a no-arbitrage yield curve factor model
 - o Pricing of other asset classes as spreads to the long-term yield
 - o Multi currencies can be covered
 - o Business-cycle interactions

Framework considerations – Modeling aspects



In effect the general form of the transition equation can be written as:

$$X_t = c + A * X_{t-1} + e_t \quad (1)$$


where X stacks the relevant variables, i.e. $X_t = [gdp_t^j, cpi_t^j, \beta_t^j, \Gamma_t^j]$ for $j \in \{EUR, US, JPY, Other\}$, e is the error term, c is a vector of constants of dimension $N - by - 1$ and A is a matrix of autoregressive parameters of dimension $N - by - N$, where N denotes the number of variables. As-

Let Z_t stack the relevant observation-equation variables, we can then write the system as:


$$Z_t = k + H * X_t + v_t, \quad (2)$$

where H is a block-composite matrix holding the relevant factor loadings that translate the underlying factors from the transition equation into observables.


Framework considerations – Modeling aspects



Framework considerations – Modeling aspects




Framework considerations – Modeling aspects




Framework considerations – Modeling aspects

A Conceptual Modelling framework – Assets and Liabilities



Framework considerations – Modeling aspects

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


Framework considerations – Modeling aspects

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Asset Class	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5
y_g_0.25	0.05	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.00
y_g_1	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
y_g_2	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
y_g_3	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
y_g_5	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
y_g_7	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.25	0.00
y_g_10	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00
s_0.25	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
s_1	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.10	0.15
s_2	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15
s_3	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15
s_5	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15
s_7	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.15
s_10	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.15
property	0.05	0.10	0.20	0.15	0.00
r_eu	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00
r_us	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00
r_w_eur	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00

Mean	1.6	0.6	3.8	2.7	0.8
VaR 99.5	-10.3	-10.4	-26.3	-6.7	-6.4
VaR 99.0	-8.9	-9.2	-23.0	-5.9	-5.6
VaR 95.0	-5.8	-6.1	-14.7	-3.1	-3.5
ES 99.5	-11.7	-12.1	-30.8	-7.9	-7.5
ES 99.0	-10.6	-10.9	-27.6	-7.1	-6.7
ES 95	-7.8	-8.0	-19.9	-4.7	-4.8



- A simulation based framework would allow for:
 - o Consistent evolution of macro and financial variables in the design of stress test exercises
 - o Back testing of bottom-up stress-test results
 - o Comprehensive financial market modelling
 - o Having a yard-stick to measure ad-hoc scenarios against
- Together with behavioral assumptions on the investment strategies of undertakings more interesting issues can be examined
- Consistency with other stress-tests can be ensured
 - o Liability stresses at a certain confidence levels can be devised
 - o Banking sector stresses in terms of drivers and confidence levels
- Common understand of stress-testing could be facilitated



Thank You.

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