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Risk Management in the Business Process by David R. Koenig

This weblog looks to promote the use of risk management as an enhancement to the business decision making process. It is the author's belief that risk management can only realize its full potential when it has become ingrained as a normal part of every business decision.

 

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March 20, 2008

Survey Results: Is Fair-Value Accounting Exacerbating the Credit Contraction?

This week, the Financial Times asked at the end of their Tuesday opinion piece whether some elements of Basel II that are contributing to pro-cyclicality of the credit cycle and elements of fair-value accounting should temporarily be suspended. Today it was reported that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK has held 'round table' meetings with banks and leading auditors to discuss fair value accounting as part of its analysis of valuation techniques in the current market turmoil. Last week we invited a group of professionals involved in risk management to share their opinions about fair-value accounting and whether it has contributed to the current credit contraction. Results follow.

When asked if Fair-Value Accounting was a good idea/concept, there was very strong support for it. Nearly 50% "strongly agreed" with the statement, while a further 40% agreed. Just 4% of respondents disagreed that Fair-Value Accounting is a good idea/concept.

Opinions changed a bit when asked if Fair-Value Accounting was a good practice. Nearly 40% strongly agreed that it was a good practice, while the same percentage "agreed". Those that disagreed were 17% of the responses.

We next asked whether the practice of Fair-Value Accounting had exacerbated the current credit contraction In this context, our respondents, even those who strongly support Fair-Value Accounting as a concept and practice, suggested some culpability.

Of respondents to our survey, two-thirds of those who agreed that Fair-Value Accounting was a good practice agreed or strongly agreed that it had contributed to the current credit contraction. Even 40% of those who strongly agreed that Fair-Value Accounting was a good practice, felt that it had exacerbated the current situation. Overall, 58% of respondents felt that Fair-Value Accounting has exacerbated the current credit contraction.

So, if there is a belief that Fair-Value Accounting is culpable, then is there merit to the concept of taking a "holiday" from it? What are the implications of such a move? Here our survey participants held little back. Comments were generally skeptical of a "fair-value holiday" like a "banking holiday". All comments are reported in a separate file (see link below), but some interesting quotes follow.

We asked the following: "In 1933, when US banks experienced runs on their liquid assets, a 'bank holiday' was declared through the Emergency Banking Act. Newly elected President Roosevelt called a special session of Congress which resulted in a mandatory four-day 'bank holiday'. This act provided for the reopening of banks after federal inspectors had declared them to be financially secure.

Should the international accounting bodies consider declaring a 'Fair-Value Accounting Holiday' when market conditions suggest a major displacement between 'value' and 'price' that render mark-to-market accounting reports misleading?

The concept would require that 'reasonable' mark-to-model prices be used for valuation, with some form of penalty for anyone who abused the process. The accountants, following a thorough review, could declare the institution's assets to be fairly valued using mark-to-model methods during such a 'Fair-Value Accounting Holiday'. Once liquidity conditions returned to normal, the holiday could be canceled.

Please share your reactions, comments and suggestions about this concept below. (This is not a recommended action, merely a request for discussion)"


"I don't think a holiday is necessary, just a clear policy statement of a) the difference between mark-to-market and fair-value and b) how fair value should and should not be determined." - Senior executive at one of the largest diversified financial services companies in their industry

"[A] Fair Value Accounting Holiday will be a way of hiding the issue beneath the carpet." - Mid-level manager at one of the largest diversified financial services companies in their industry

"Given the complexity of the m-t-m models a year's holiday would be required. More the mixed earnings/FV concepts cause the problems, not so much the FVs." - Board member from an average sized software/consulting firm

"You are now trying to play with supply and demand -- free markets are free markets -- and dislocations are events that take place for a reason (generally abuse)" - Mid-level technical specialist for one of the largest IT firms in its industry

"A Nobel prize awaits anyone who can provide a definition of "reasonable mark-to-model prices" that avoids arbitrariness and perverse-incentives." - Anonymous respondent

Click here to read all respondent comments, many of which were quite interesting.


The respondents represent diverse industries, of diverse size and are of generally high seniority in their firms:


We received 30 responses from invited participants and 5 additional responses from an open web link to the survey in the risk management section of LinkedIn or from the PRMIA website.


In addition to the above choices, respondents chose the "other" option with the following data: IT (2), Analytics (1), Consulting and Education (1), Consulting and Software (1), Audit (1), Clearing House (1).

Here are some links to recent news stories on the subject:

IASB defends use of 'fair value' accounting (Financial Director)

Accounting rulemakers defend use of 'fair value' (FT)

US SEC working on "fair value" accounting tips (Reuters)

AIG requests rethink on 'fair value' accounting (CNN Money)

The mark to market fiasco (Financial Post)


The FT editorial also asked whether some of the components of Basel II that are feared to be pro-cyclical in their design might also be suspended. Read my past comments on the pro-cyclicality of Basel II and the Social Amplification of Risk and "Pension Fund Animals" as they relate to the current credit contraction.

Posted by dkoenig at March 20, 2008 11:53 PM

Comments

Our colleagues who support FVA are absolutely right to say that investors want and need better and more timely disclosure by companies. Unfortunately, proponents of fair value accounting refuse to recognise the practical obstacles to achieving this laudable goal and the peverse impact of the implimentation of these imperfect rules on investor perception.

Valuing illiquid assets is a subjective task rife with conflicts. Some auditors, for example, fearing sanctions and litigation, take the safe bet and simply write down these assets -- even if the assets are not impaired! And each investor and auditor takes a different approach to such estimates. Is this fair value? Investors are not helped by the arbitrary and inconsistent application of fair value measures.

There are times when we all must accept that good ideas are impractical to implement, especially when the effect of such imperfect solutions as fair value accounting is so terrible. Or as we say in the world of technology, fair value accounting is possible, but very difficult!

Posted by: rc whalen at March 22, 2008 11:27 AM

I think the current problem caused by fair value accounting, especially as it is currently being applied to mortgage-related securities is the unanticipated and unprecedented discrepancy between price and value. This discrepancy is not caused by actual credit losses suffered by security investors but by the industry and regulator adoption of using the ABX index, which tracks the price of credit default swaps,rather than actual mortgage-backed securities.
Since purchasers and sellers of credit default swaps are not required to own the mortgage-backed securities the swaps were created to protect, the ABX index price indicates the degree of speculation in the mortgage-backed securities credit, and is in no way related to the credit performance of such securities. If you don't accept this premise, see if you can find substantial realized losses, not declines in market value, but actual realized losses incurred with respect to the recently written-down mortgage-related securities portfolios held by Citi, Merrill, UBS, etc. Trust me, any actual realized losses you find will be at least 95% less than the amount each investor has written down.
So-if the far majority of exisiting, rated, mortgage-backed securities are cashflowing (i.e. monthly payments of principal and interest are being distributed to investors) then the "fair value" should be determined by present valuing the projected cashflow related to the mortgage-backed securities using a discount factor derived from assessing the quality of the mortgage collateral, the lender, the servicer, the mortgage terms, performance and rate.
Unfortunately, no matter how much the market and regulators want one, there is no objective way to value most securities. A value cannot be determined by simply glancing at an index, or a rating, or calling the firm down the street. Mortgage backed securities (and most others) are not fungible and as long as humans have free will to create idiosyncratic financing methods, they never can be.
Lack of bidders is an indication that the market is not interested in such investments period. Value and price are not identical concepts -in fact the inherent disparity between the two is how most of us make our money.

Posted by: Maureen Bolton at March 28, 2008 10:56 AM

While not granting a holiday, the following letter does seem to give some room for more subjective measures given the dislocations in auction rate and other CDO securities.

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/fairvalueltr0308.htm

While the pain of the write downs and increased reserves is felt today, I wonder if inflated ROICs and ROEs are the next story in 2009 when books have been marked down and actual realized losses end up not as severe. (Call me an optimist.) With 157 and the litigations seen across Directors & Officers and auditors brought by shareholders on any share weakness, the margin of error professionals will have to apply will likely prove more conservative than necessary.

Posted by: John Farrall at April 16, 2008 05:30 AM

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