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YerramuniverseThis Blog articulates on issues of risk management - credit and operational risk management with sectoral perspectives on Agriculture and SMEs and with focus on Asian economies in general and Indian economy in particular May 17, 2010 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN INDIA TOO ON THE SCANNER.Credit rating agencies are organizations that rate the creditworthiness of a company or a financial product, such as a debt security or money market instrument. SEBI recently issued a 15-page circular on the disclosure norms relating to rating agencies (CRA) that have generally been welcomed. 'Be a Roman while in Rome' the saying goes. When we have integrated with the financial system globally, we need to see what reforms are round the corner in making assembly line credit flows to the corporates and SMEs more effective. CRAs attracted the ire of the investors in the context of the global financial crisis and the Securities Exchange Commission of US also went into the act of reforming them. The reforms were voted by the Senate recently. In the past, critics accused the ratings firms of being hotbeds of conflicts of interests. They are paid by the companies whose investments they rate. The raters often defend themselves by saying they are simply providing an opinion. The three big credit-rating firms -- Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings -- have faced stinging criticism in the past two years for giving high marks to mortgage-related securities that were backed by subprime or otherwise risky loans, helping instill a false sense of confidence among investors in the investments being sold by banks. "These rating agencies were falsely elevated to some god-like status that when they put a triple-A rating on something, you could take all of your mother's savings and invest it in there and you were doing the right thing," said Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski (D-Pa.), the sponsor of the US-Bill to reform the Credit Rating Agencies. In the US, ratings were issued on collateralized and other structured products that were based on very limited performance data. The Chartered Financial Analysts did a global survey last year to confirm that the ratings are not useful instruments to take investment decisions. Although debt rating started late in India, and these rating agencies with their compatriots, CRISIL, ICRA etc., were only rating investments in the past, they are the most respected rating agencies recognized by the regulator, RBI even in India. Most Banks, which are wont to go by the advisory of the RBI, have now come to swear by them. Most Indian Banks also moved to template lending or Assembly line approach to lending through the Centralized Processing Platforms redefining their approaches to do due diligence of the enterprises they finance. Speed has become the essence of the game of competition among banks. Now that the futures markets and derivative markets have become more active than before, and their late entry into debt rating is more by patronage of the Banks and FIs it is important that the other regulator - RBI - also looks at the Report Card on rating agencies and resolve certain inherent conflicts. SEC resolved to create a stronger, more robust regulatory framework for credit rating agencies. SEC adopted rules to provide greater information concerning ratings histories - and to enable competing credit rating agencies to offer unsolicited ratings for structured finance products, by granting them access to the necessary underlying data for structured products. May be that we look at what SEC did vs what SEBI did to see what more actions are required in the Indian context. A few salient features can be viewed by clicking here. In India, the track record of the Rating Agencies may not have much to show up in favour or against them. However, one needs to know that these Rating Agencies that have been rating the investments and investors also started rating the debt instruments and the vendors of the rated companies, who are mostly the SMEs. None of the rating agencies reduced the ratings to any large industrial enterprise on the ground that they owe monies to their vendor SMEs for more than the contracted period for all payments of more than Rs.2lakhs as required under the Companies Act, 2000. The RBI should actually insist on different rating agencies for rating the Corporates and their related SME vendors. It is also desirable that the payment for rating agencies should come from the institutions that seek rating. It is a different matter if such amount is later recovered from the liability firm. The Credit Information Services are at a nascent stage having entered the business just a few months ago - with the exception of CIBIL that was set up during the first decade of the millennium. Transparency in client information is a long way to go as unshared data is more than the shared data both about individuals and institutions. In this scenario, the RBI also should consider issuing more detailed instructions on rating agencies, their ways of assessment, forms and reports in the public domain. In essence, there should be a mechanism to evaluate the performance of Rating agencies. Further the method of payment also needs to be linked to the extent possible to evaluation. Their services have value but to what extent one should depend on their rating also needs to be quantified. There should be a recompense clause and the rating agencies should be made to compensate may be, not to the full extent, but by way of penalty for wrong ratings or variance in rating on a large scale. Their rating performance over a period has to be made transparent for the benefit of investors and for every one connected to evaluate. CRISIL perhaps deserves some compliments in this regard for its most recent report on the defaults of corporate entities on their debt obligations. Notwithstanding the growth figures in manufacturing sector unleashed by the CSO and the laudatory surveys of the CII and FICCI in that direction, the Report attributed the slow recovery of fundamentals of Corporate India in 2009 to the liquidity crunch and a slide in their overall credit worthiness. This leads us to question the efficacy of the stimulus package announced by both the Government and the RBI. It is time that the Banks go back to basics and do due diligence and seek support from the CRA just as yet another support for their credit decision until full scale reforms in credit information and credit rating take off in the financial sector. Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 05:19 PM | Comments (0) October 27, 2009 Compensations and GovernanceFinancial institutions in India - particularly Banks, 82 percent of which are in public sector - are no where their global counterparts. Private sector big brothers however are different and they come close to the FIs in the west. The code has not been built. Timothy Rayon, CEO of SIFMA released interesting guidelines last week and they are worthy of emulation in Asian FIs. The Boards should oversea the compensation packages with appropriate oversight through the Compensation Committee. In India, these compensation committees just do not exist. The public sector banks shall get their endorsement from the Government of India - Secretary, Banking of the Union Ministry of Finance. You will be surprised to note that even their membership to PRMIA or any professional association shall also be approved by the Department of Banking where a junior official, far far junior to the Chairman of a Bank presides over the decision!! The Regulator - in the case of Public Sector Banks, more the Government than the Reserve Bank of India, the Central Bank that would decide several governance issues. Despite a Board existing, it is more puppetry and looks at some technical issues. Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 02:22 AM | Comments (0) August 21, 2009 Challenges before the Central BanksCHALLENGES BEFORE THE CENTRAL BANK Platinum Jubilee celebrations of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) started with a bang: three distinguished past Governors and the present Governor discussed the challenges before the Central Bank before an invited audience. The time is ripe and the context is right in the backdrop of the continuing debate on the role of central banks in all the major economies after the precipitous fall of major banks due to the sub-prime crisis in the US. The Federal Reserve of the US and the Financial Services Authority of UK or the Central Banks in European Union are already in the process of change. The boundaries of Regulation and Supervision, the role of Credit Rating Agencies, and the reforms in the financial sector continue to be matters of discussion. If somebody embraces a beautiful lady, he cannot after all avoid the perfumes or odour of that beautiful lady. Globalization is such beautiful lady. Global financial integration, therefore, has forced the nations on the fringe to fall in line with the crisis-ridden countries in undertaking financial sector reforms. As Dr Y.V.Reddy, immediate past Governor, RBI said most Central Banks are unable to crystallize on where to begin these Reforms and what type of reforms they should undertake with what expectations. All said and done, reform is a process and not an end in itself. Therefore, destination and path of reforms is still a debate, he said. “Globally the financial system is footloose. And because of this, the financial sector takes advantage of tax and regulatory arbitrage.” In a crisis situation, liquidity and exit routes become extremely important. The present Governor highlighted four major challenges before the Central Banks: 1. Achieving coordination between monetary and fiscal policies; 2. defining the mandate of central banks and reforming the regulatory architecture; 3. getting the right balance between regulation and liberalization; and 4. the way to conduct Monetary Policy in a globalized world. Monetary policy has become the first line of defense. He was of the firm view that inflation targeting does not deliver macroeconomic and financial stability. There are again challenges to managing capital flows. Dr C. Rangarajan, Chairman of the Prime Minster’s Economic Advisory Council mentioned that the primary objective of monetary policy is maintaining price stability. One of the lessons learnt from the current crisis is to put appropriate regulatory framework that embraces and applies to all segments of the economy. While independence of Central Bank is most required, coordination between the Government and Central Bank at critical points like in the times of slowing economic growth becomes very important. The issue of multiple regulators and lack of coordination has been highlighted by the architect of India’s Financial Sector Reforms, Mr. M. Narasimham, and former Executive Director, World Bank. He called for a high level panel of regulators headed by the Central Bank that could prevent regulatory arbitrage in times of crisis. By becoming regulator of last resort, the RBI can bring in better financial stability. When I read the recommendations of the UK parliament's Treasury Select Committee that said “The regulator should also be given more autonomy to support systemic stability without needing to justify its actions to the government or the industry”, I could not but recall what Dr Y.V.Reddy said on this subject while addressing ICRIER, Delhi on May 22, 2001. “There are several theories that attempt to explain regulation in general and financial sector regulation I particular. These include theory of competition for regulation and theory of regulatory capture on the one hand and public interest theory aimed at correcting market failures on the other. Since there are virtually no takers for frontier capitalism, the rationale for regulation lies in the search for a public policy that makes markets work better, while avoiding the dangers of excessive burden by treating regulation as a free good and the scope for regulatory capture by the few suppliers compared to the large dispersed consumers. More generally, the objectives of regulation are to avoid monopoly power, foster competition and protect the consumers’ interest. In regard to financial regulation, however, there is a slight change in emphasis in the objectives of regulation I the sense that the focus is on maintaining systemic stability and protecting the interest of the customer. Maintaining systemic stability is important because social costs of financial distress are high in the form of contagion effect.” The Report cited above identified among other things international regulation, macro-prudential supervision and institutional reform as requiring urgent attention. The world and more particularly the US would have been wiser had they cared to listen to the wisdom flowing from the East. Hopefully this weblog would capture the attention of regulators of the West. Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 12:34 PM | Comments (0) July 20, 2009 Long Live Nationalization!!Long live Nationalization, Bid Adieu Market forces. B. Yerram Raju
Out of more than 60000 bank branches in India, more than a fourth of which are in rural and remote areas with just one or two officers manning the branch, many are yet to grapple with moving their mousse. Still the pass word is treated as word that could be passed on when the original operator leaves the seat of work. Visiting cards of many of the senior officials of public sector banks in particular also do not contain either the URL of the Bank they serve or the e-mail addresses. Nationalized Banks, despite the proclaimed independence in their functioning are treated as instruments in the hands of the Government – not just the Central Government – but the States too that do not have any share in the capital of those banks – announce one scheme or other to be implemented by those banks. Populism still overweighs the economic rationale. Banks are obliged to fall in line. Loans for minorities, community-based assets, public distribution schemes irrespective of their being part of the Annual Banking Action Plans of the Districts are expected to be financed. When the Banking reforms were initiated in 1993, on the basis of Narasimham Committee Report, prudential norms were introduced; Balance sheets cleaned up; Government pumped in money into many banks to make up for what we today can call toxic assets; social banking norms were reviewed; priority sectors were redefined; market entry permitted; universal banking accepted; mutual funds, pension funds etc got under their arm. All were grilled to learn that it is the banks’ bottom line that mattered and the Capital has to be preserved. Uneconomic branches opened in the initial euphoria of nationalization were closed one after the other. Small farmer became too small to look at for the banks; tiny and small entrepreneurs were sought to be replaced with medium entrepreneurs; benchmarks of performance that were linked with priority sector credit dispensation for two and half decades from 1969 shifted to green balance sheet preparations. Fully aware that the Government-owned banks would care less for Corporate Governance – after all 51 percent is owned by the Government – Banks were grilled on Corporate Governance and all put down their declarations sacred in their Annual Reports. It is like the proverbial Indian Mother-in-law who tells her daughter-in-law on the first day of her wedlock: ‘you enjoy full freedom in the house. But you will do well to do as I say’. Banks may decide how much to pay for their CEOs; but the Government should agree for it. After all it is the owner. The Babus (read the IAS) make sure that the Bank CEOs do not draw more than what they draw in the government. Even for Business trips abroad, approval from their Government Boss is required!! Of course, for hiring employees fortunately, they have been de-bonded. Now as we step into the forty first year of Bank Nationalization, with a broad smile on our faces we watch the world embracing nationalization in the wake of increase in toxic assets and bank failures. Banks are lining up to mobilize capital from the market because almost all of them have shown high profits, notwithstanding the global meltdown. All said, thanks to the meltdown again, banks could postpone their bad and doubtful debts in corporate and SME sectors by another two years. When they surface in 2011-12, hopefully they turn good with full repayment from their otherwise non-obliging clients. Risk Management? Who cares? After all, we are engaged in risk business. The risk will take care of itself. We have a GM or VP dealing in Risk Management and the whole technology around them. One Managing Director of a public sector bank tells me that enterprise risk management is for enterprises and not for them!! Lo and behold. We have a strong regulator and all would be well with us. But how many Bank Boards have Directors with understanding of Risk Management of various hues? This is a question affecting that is bothering the world today. India should not be an exception. In this forty-first year of nationalization of banks in our country, our concerns require a new drive. It is widely held at this point of time that government accountability holds the key to future governance of banks – more when they are nationalized.
Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 11:39 AM | Comments (0) May 01, 2009 RISK and REWARD NOT NECESSARILY TWO SIDES OF THE COINSeveral Professors teaching risk management invariably used to tell the students that risk and reward are two sides of the coin. Some half-baked theories used to say uncertainty and risk are also two sides of the coin. The events that unfolded after the sub-prime crisis have disproved both of them. Risk arose from unknown quarters. All the mathematicians and statisticians engaged in creating risk technology platforms proved their ignorance of the ways the finance would behave with the theorists. 'Risk is a state of nature while uncertainty is a state of mind.' Indian almanacs and meteorologists predict weather and monsoon. Their prediction in a year was that monsoon would be good on average. The copious rainfall occurred for three months continuously flooding the areas, excessive flows of rivers and rivulets that had to join the sea and the damage to crops occurred irreparably. The next six months there was not a drop of rain and the re-sown crops dried up for want of water. The predictions were right in the averages. But they were useless for the farmer and the economy. Is risk definable and predictable on the basis of past trends? Does theory of probability help the monetarists and market specialists? Can the failures be insured successfully? Can human greed be predicted? Crisis after crisis we keep learning new lessons in answering some of these questions. But the dog's tail can never be straightened. The Obama's rescue package based on some sensible conditions has not brought senses to the Citi when it announced that it would consider paying bonus to its executives notwithstanding the infusion of capital to save itself from collapse. Therefore, it is not capital infusion or its adequacy that is an insurance against the failure of banks. Adequacy of capital, it is proved, is no insurance for the risks that the institutions face. It calls for properly understanding risk, uncertainty and safety. Continue reading "RISK and REWARD NOT NECESSARILY TWO SIDES OF THE COIN" Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 04:07 AM | Comments (5) April 01, 2009 INDIA NEEDS TO DO SOMETHING MORE... CRISIS OR NO CRISISTwo masons engaged in constructing my neighbour's house were discussing the issue of opening a bank account. Mason A said that he would prefer State Bank of India while Mason B said he would do it with the Andhra Bank. Mason B's spouse said government banks like this are the best bet because they would not fail and that their deposits would be safe with them. This speaks of the confidence that even the poorer sections of population have in the Indian public sector banks. Lack of Confidence is not an issue with the Indian Financial System as is prevailing in the rest of the countries badly affected by the current financial crisis. In the current financial tsunami, life jackets failed to prevent the sinking boats. Banks in UK, Iceland, and even the US resorted to the most criticized and least preferred route of nationalization of banks. The latest OBAMA initiative that received positive response of stock markets since the announcement of Toxic Loan basket takeover under a joint Government-Private Fund, is however inadequate to retrofit the lost confidence in the financial system. The revival of 'protectionist' actions would seem to be asserting more in finance than in trade. While the regulators of G-20 would be meeting at the start of April 2009, global regulatory regime has serious limitations and they have to be realigned with domestic regulations that have compulsive cultural characteristics. Events so far have proved beyond doubt that a global regulatory regime would not be able to provide appropriate solutions to the type of recession that had set in more due to greed and failure of a particular country's regulatory and systemic failure than due to a global oversight - for instance, Basel II. This is not to decry the modicum of discipline that Basel II has introduced. It has its virtues and financial regulators around the globe may seek more flexibility in its implementation. Be that as it may, India and China matter to the rest of the world. And therefore, it is important for India to realize its distinction in the emerging economic scenario and how necessary it is to turn the head on the screws. Continue reading "INDIA NEEDS TO DO SOMETHING MORE... CRISIS OR NO CRISIS" Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 01:38 AM | Comments (1) January 27, 2009 Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 10:19 AM | Comments (1) October 13, 2008 Exotic Options turn ChaoticLife will never be the same again in the financial world where the staunch private market arguers turned to the State Treasury and Central Banks for the crises bail-out. Risk Analysts of repute at CREDITSIGHTS said amidst the crisis that "the growth of the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market over the past decade has outpaced development of settlement systems and trading infrastructure. " CDS are just instruments that provide a form of insurance on fixed-income assets. The protection given to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac necessitated the International Swaps and Derivatives Association to launch a protocol to facilitate settlement of credit derivative trades involving these two firms. The take over of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the systemic crisis that followed triggered a default on credit default swaps - instruments that provide a form of insurance on fixed-income assets. While the Dealers in the market are working to settle these contracts, after deep threats, the $700bn bail-out has been voted favorably by the US Congress. All the rules and regulations of Basel II could not rescue either the European Banks from near collapse and four UK banks were nationalized in a matter of just seven months. The villain of the piece is the exotic options and credit derivatives. The chaos they brought in seems to be unending. Is Capital an adequate measure when greed perpetuates and gilt-edged guarantees and securitization have the potential to increase the moral hazard? How can we safeguard the global financial system and provide architecture sturdier than the present? This paper would like to look at the current regulations under Basel II in such backdrop. Harder lessons had to come by. I recall an Occasional Paper of the IMF (124 of 1995) that had put down the impacts of financial liberalization on asset markets of Japan in the later half of 1980s. The increased lending to property markets that fuelled the boom in the prices of both residential and commercial properties boosting the value of collaterals of the SMEs followed by a sharp economic downturn adversely impacted on the financial sector profitability. The lessons of the Asian meltdown of the 1990s, again due to the real estate markets, erratic behaviour pepped up by the greed of the financial institutions were also forgotten. The same Citi, Susan Credit, Merril Lynch, Lehman Brothers, the un-repenting Credit Rating Agencies forgot the scratches and screaming quickly and entered the sub-prime mortgage markets without demur. Even the US Savings-Loan debacle of the 1980s has been a forgotten history in that country,s financial circles. The US crisis proved that even strong fundamentals flounder against weak regulation. "Lax oversight did indeed allow financial firms to borrow far more than was prudent (a leverage ratio of 30 or 40:1) to make bets that have gone sour. Tougher regulations might have prevented this. (Economist 20th Sep 2008) Alan Greenspan, extolled as the best US Fed Regulator for more than two decades has neither to regret nor explain. It is Prof Bernanke,s unenviable task to alter this legacy. Now the Investment Banks winding up in US are entering the virgin Indian Financial Markets. Unless safeguard measures of the global financial system are revisited and put in place, there could be a burn-out of the emerging economies, ere long. The time is more opportune now than ever and there are enough lessons to learn. The much-abused and most-extolled market-led reforms are now strongly positioned against each other with the US Fed rescuing Bear Sterns, nationalizing the tainted Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage guaranteeing institutions, infusing capital of the order of $700bn to rescue the AIG Insurance to prevent the global contagion effect after throwing Lehman Brothers to fend for themselves. When the Asian meltdown occurred, the Council of Foreign Relations had set up a Task Force with Carla A. Hills and Peter G. Peterson as Co-Chair persons to suggest measures for safeguarding the global financial system - The Future International Financial Architecture. Some of its recommendations are worthy of a revisit at this juncture as the content of that Report seemed to have been put in archives, notwithstanding its pitch for market-related financial sector reforms that would "create greater incentives for borrowing countries to strengthen their crisis prevention efforts and for their private creditors to assume their fair share of the burden associated with resolving the crisis." Good house-keeping had its first ticket. Its advice to IMF: crisis-lending - less will do more. For country crises, the IMF should abandon huge rescue packages. In this hour of crises in the US, Washington trio is observing golden silence as its role has been taken by the US Treasury Secretary. Task Force is tougher in the measures it proposes to reduce moral hazard and to induce private creditors to accept their fair share of the burden of crisis resolution. Triple ,B, rated mortgages were assigned triple ,A, ratings at counterparty derivative instruments by all the leading Rating Agencies like the Fitch, Standard and Poor, Moodys etc., with absolute impunity. Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association,s Task Force recommended wide ranging reforms of the Credit Rating agencies and transparency in rating methodologies. It is not yet known whether such reforms would be part of the global financial architecture. In the context of implementation of Basel II tri-pilloried Risk Management heavily depending on external credit ratings, it is but essential that the Credit Rating Agencies globally should conform to the new reforms suggested by SIFMA in August 2008. It is time to cry halt to the paymaster calling shots on ratings. Briefly, the lessons: Let me now look at what Basel II has to say on the derivatives. Basel II requires valuation and analysis of exotic options, over-the-counter (OTC) exotic derivatives, and credit derivatives. Section 112 says: ,The comprehensive approach for the treatment of collateral will also be applied to calculate the counterparty risk charges for OTC derivatives and repo-style transactions booked in the trading book., ,Where guarantees or credit derivatives are direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional, and supervisors are satisfied that banks fulfill certain minimum operational conditions relating to risk management processes they may allow banks to take account of such credit protection in calculating credit requirements., (Sec140) Basel II also expects that the maturity of the underlying exposure and the maturity of the hedge should both be defined conservatively.. For the hedge, embedded options which may reduce the term of the hedge should be taken into account so that the shortest possible effective maturity is use. But the US Banks did not choose to adopt Basel II and the European counterparts were mauled and the disaster that followed is everywhere in print and the global contagion as a result of indiscreetly rated exotic options continues unhalted. Now that the Investment Banks are getting subsumed or merged or bought over by the commercial banks, it is important to recognize the compulsions for the Banks as well in respect of counterparty risk: Banks will be required to calculate counterparty credit risk charge for OTC derivatives, repo-style transactions booked in the trading book, separate from the capital charge for general market risk and specific risk. The risk weights to be used in this calculation must be consistent with those used for calculating the capital requirements in the banking book. Exotic options are used in a variety of settings in a bank, including the applications of general risk hedging and credit risk hedging. Banks should have methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk involved in exposures to individual borrowers or counterparties as well as at the portfolio level. (Sec733) The credit review assessment of capital adequacy, at a minimum, should cover: 1.Risk rating systems; 2. Portfolio analysis/aggregation ; 3. Securitization/complex derivatives ; and 4. Large exposures and risk concentrations. Pre-deal checks should be netted accurately in regard to portfolio-based exposures. Portfolio Analysis is not just a pre-requisite under Basel II Accord. It actually makes sense for a bank to manage its investments/loans portfolios: an optimal portfolio can generate added profits and lower expenses and required economic capital for the bank. Exposure at default (EAD) is only secondary to primary risk assessment. Dimensions of risk should guide risk managers to set timelines and their management. Pre-deal limit checks should be performed via real-time interface the dedicated credit limits system and the front office. Cost of credit that includes both the expected and unexpected losses should be held to the minimum and separate to limit checking. The financial architecture developed under the shadow of US Banking, where the investment banks, broking institution, mutual funds, retail banking, asset reconstruction companies, commercial banking, housing finance arms, insurance companies, re-insurance companies, and advisories are under one roof of a Holding Company under the garb of efficient customer service, is fraught with severe risk. In India, where 70 percent of banking is under the public sector fold, which effectively means that they are insulated from any misdemeanors of the nature that such combined operations could upset in the long run, we should not move closer to bail-outs by the exchequer. It is perhaps worthwhile for the super regulator in India to rethink the strategies for combating the operational risks more effectively than now with higher capital allocation than now instead of allocating higher risk capital for credit risk default. Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 04:44 PM | Comments (9) October 04, 2008 About Yerram Raju BeharaDr. Yerram Raju Behara, presently Regional Director of PRMIA-Hyderabad Chapter is a banker turned economist with about three decades of experience in banking and a decade and half experience in academics and consulting. His banking experience is with the country's biggest public sector bank, State Bank of India. He is currently Member of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Reserve Bank of India on SME sector. His academic experience was as Professor of Economics with LBS National Academy of Administration, Mussorie, Dean of Studies with Administrative Staff College of India-Center for Excellence for Practicing Managers in Government, Public and Private Sector Corporates and Joint Director, Institute of Public Enterprise, Hyderabad. He is also a member of the Board of Governors of the Siva Sivani Institute of Management, Hyderabad. He was Adjunct Professor, Gitam Institute of Foreign Trade, Gitam University (Visakhapatnam) and Visiting Professor of Acharya Nagarjuna University, Guntur (Andhra Pradesh). He was Special Invitee Member of the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness set up by the Union Ministry of Finance (2006) and Member of the Working Group on Capacity Building of Ports with the Union Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (2008). He has authored over 500 articles in leading financial dailies in India and other financial journals of India and overseas. He has authored and co-authored eight books covering Agriculture, Banking, SMEs, Corporate Governance and Economic Planning. Continue reading "About Yerram Raju Behara" Posted by Yerram Raju Behara at 06:42 AM | Comments (0) |
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